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Stark: Montana's Spendthrift Trust Doctrine

MONTANA'S SPENDTHRIFT TRUST DOCTRINE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Justin W. Stark
I. INTRODUCTION

Trusts are frequently a vehicle to provide income or principal to a beneficiary.' Generally, the beneficiary may transfer her
interest and third party claimants may reach her interest in the
trust.2 If, however, the settlor imposes restraints on the alienation of the beneficiary's interest, this is referred to as a spendthrift trust.3 Spendthrift trust provisions pervade most modern
trusts.4 The vast majority of states recognize spendthrift trusts
as valid, yet these states nearly all provide for exceptions to
spendthrift trusts under certain circumstances.5 Montana's
spendthrift trust doctrine is unique because it allows the severe
restraints in spendthrift trusts to operate without many of the
exceptions imposed by the courts and legislatures of other
states.6 Thus, the spendthrift trust protection for the
beneficiary's interest is stronger in Montana than in almost any
other state.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of spendthrift
trusts, including a brief history of their evolution. This part also
examines exceptions to spendthrift trusts created by legislatures
and courts in the United States, including the rationales given
for restricting spendthrift trusts. Part III of this Comment analyzes the policies that underlie spendthrift trusts and their exceptions. Part IV suggests revisions to Montana's spendthrift
trust statutes.
This Comment suggests that Montana's spendthrift trust
statutes7 should be revised for several reasons. First, current

1.

ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS 2 (2d ed. 1947).
Id. at 9-10.
3. Id. at 2-3; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 152(2) (1957) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT]. Unlike in a discretionary trust, the restraint on alienation in a
spendthrift trust does not depend on the shield of trustee discretion. See infra notes
133-37 and accompanying text.
4.
GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 222, n.7 (rev. 2d ed. repl. vol. 1992).
5. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-7707 (1995) (allowing the beneficiary's
interest in a spendthrift trust to be reached for child and spouse support, necessary
services provided to the beneficiary or the trust interest, and government claims); see
also infra notes 86-120 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.

2.

7.

MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-33-301 to -302 (1995).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1996

1

212

Montana
Law Review,
Vol. REVIEW
57 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 8
LAW
MONTANA

[Vol. 57

statutes governing spendthrift trusts contradict important policy
considerations in Montana. Second, other trust types are available that, if used instead of spendthrift trusts, accomplish many
of the same goals as spendthrift trusts without their negative
implications. The spendthrift trust statutes thus may be revised
without preventing a potential settlor from providing for a beneficiary. Third, the spendthrift trust statutes conflict with other
Montana statutes, e.g., the statutes which facilitate efforts to
collect child support.' In sum, Montana should modernize its
spendthrift trust doctrine to recognize the competing policy interests and to respond to the current needs of society.

II. BACKGROUND
A. The PracticalImpact of Spendthrift Trusts
Unless the trust expresses otherwise, the beneficiary of a
trust can transfer his interest in the trust.9 Third party creditors can also reach the beneficiary's interest to satisfy their
claims."° However, a spendthrift trust provision allows a settlor
to prevent both the beneficiary of the trust from alienating the
beneficiary's interest voluntarily, and third party claimants from
reaching this interest."
No specific language is necessary to create a spendthrift
trust. 2 However, a typical example of the language used in a
spendthrift provision is:

8. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-5-242 (1995).
9. GRISWOLD, supra note 1, at 9-10; BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 4, § 188,
at 456-71; see, e.g., Hull v. Rolfsrud, 65 N.W.2d 94, 105 (N.D. 1954) (explaining that
when the trust does not expressly restrain the beneficiary, he can transfer his interest in the trust).
10.
GRISWOLD, supra note 1, at 9-10.
11. Id. at 2. An example may best explain the concept. Mr. Jones, unemployed,
is the beneficiary of a trust and begins to receive $5,000 per month of the trust
income. To fulfill his child support obligations, Mr. Jones assigns $1,000 of his trust
interest each month to his former wife, Ms. Jones, for the support of their children.
The trustee refuses to distribute directly to Ms. Jones, stating that a provision in
the trust, a spendthrift provision, prevents Mr. Jones from assigning his interest. See
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-33-301 (1995). Ms. Jones is left hoping that Mr. Jones will
fulfill his support obligation when he receives each disbursement from the trust.
Now further imagine the situation in which Mr. Jones refuses to make his
support payments after receiving each monthly payment from the trust. Ms. Jones
attempts to execute a lien against Mr. Jones' interest in the trust. Her claim is
denied because it cannot prevail over the spendthrift provision. Id.; see also infra
notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
12.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 152 cmt. c.
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No interest of any beneficiary of any trust created hereunder
shall be subject to sale, assignment, pledge, or transfer by any
beneficiary in any form or manner whatsoever, nor shall the
principal of the trust or the income arising therefrom be liable
for any debt of or any judgment against any beneficiary
through the process of any court. 3
A spendthrift trust provision is a powerful tool for the settlor. The settlor can use it to ensure the support of the beneficiary without concern that the beneficiary could ever squander or
assign his interest. The spendthrift provision also frees the settlor from relying on the discretion of the trustee to protect the
beneficiary's interest, as required in a discretionary trust.
For the beneficiary, the spendthrift trust can be both a curse
and a blessing. The curse is that the beneficiary receives a property interest but not the right to alienate that interest. The
blessing is that the spendthrift provision bars third parties from
reaching the beneficiary's interest. Spendthrift trusts thus pose a
dilemma. The dilemma arises because the protection of the
spendthrift trust conflicts with other policy goals of society. 4
Some of these other goals are the support of children," the payment of tax obligations, 6 and the general belief that people
should pay their debts. No creditor, no matter how justified, can
reach the beneficiary's interest in a valid spendthrift trust in
Montana. 7 Plainly stated, the spendthrift trust allows the beneficiary to rely on a property interest, without concern that others will take that interest away.
The dilemma of spendthrift trusts is perhaps best illustrated
by two eloquent characterizations, one validating spendthrift
trusts and the other criticizing them. One court, faced with interpreting a spendthrift trust, asked:
Why should not a father having a dissolute, improvident or
unfortunate son, be able to so bestow his own property as to
protect that son from penury and want? Why should not a loving wife be allowed to so deposit her separate estate in the
hands of a trustee so as to keep her aged, unfortunate, disso13. Lundgren v. Hoglund, 219 Mont. 295, 300, 711 P.2d 809, 812 (1985).
14. This dilemma is external to the trust itself. However, there is also an internal dilemma, pitting the intent of the settlor to control distribution against the
beneficiary's right to exercise her interest in the property as she sees fit.
15. See infra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 159-63
and accompanying text.
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lute, or improvident husband from trudging his weary way over
the hill to the poorhouse? Why should not any one be allowed
to use his own property so as to keep the gaunt wolf of grinding
poverty from the home door of those near and dear to his
heart?"8

A prominent critic of spendthrift trusts encouraged a different
perspective:
That grown men should be kept all their lives in pupilage, that
men not paying their debts should live in luxury on inherited
wealth, are doctrines as undemocratic as can well be conceived ....
The general introduction of spendthrift trusts
would be to form a privileged class, who could indulge in every
speculation, could practise every fraud, and yet, provided they
kept on the safe side of the criminal law, could roll in wealth.
They would be an aristocracy, though certainly the most contemptible aristocracy with which a country was ever cursed. 9

The dilemma, of course, is that both viewpoints are valid. A
major tenet of trust law is that the settlor's intent must be realized. The settlor is able to control fully gifts to the beneficiary
while alive, so the settlor sees no reason why he should not be
able to do so in a trust. However, another general tenet of law is
that debts should be paid, so restriction of the settlor's intent
may be appropriate. °
The practical ramifications of spendthrift trusts in certain
contexts are dramatic. To the extent that state law recognizes
spendthrift trusts, a beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust
is not included in the estate of the beneficiary in bankruptcy."'
The beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust also might not be
included in determining whether she is eligible for public assistance.22 One commentator stated that the spendthrift trust has
18.
Guernsey v. Lazear, 41 S.E. 405, 410 (W. Va. 1902) (Brannon, J.).
19. JOHN C. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY § 211, at 24647 (2d ed. 1895).
20.
Since spendthrift trusts are primarily a matter of state law and policy
drives their acceptance or rejection in each state, their validity varies greatly by
jurisdiction. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 4, § 222, at 380-81.
21. Under bankruptcy law, the interest in a spendthrift trust will be excluded
from the bankruptcy estate if the state deems spendthrift trusts valid under "applicable nonbankruptcy law." 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1994). See generally Jack E. Karns,
ERISA Qualified Pension Plan Benefits as Property of the Bankruptcy Estate: The
Unanswered Questions After Patterson v. Shumate, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 303 (1994)
(discussing that the anti-alienation provisions in ERISA plans would protect the assets in a pension account even in a state that did allow attachment of a beneficiary's
interest in a spendthrift trust).
22. See infra notes 111-14, 156-63 and accompanying text; Mayer Y. Silber, The

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol57/iss1/8

4

1996]

Stark: Montana's Spendthrift Trust Doctrine

SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS

215

always been "a creditor-avoidance technique."" Indeed, spendthrift trusts often seem to contradict ordinary notions of personal
financial responsibility.
It should be observed that the interest in a spendthrift trust
is inalienable only until distributed to the beneficiary.24 Once
the beneficiary receives the disbursement, his creditors can reach
that amount." The beneficiary may commit herself to paying
the proceeds to another in at least three ways: by (1) requesting
the trustee to pay the third party, (2) executing a power of attorney to the third party to act as distributee of the beneficiary's
interest, or (3) contracting with the third party to pay upon receiving the distribution.2 6 With these methods, the beneficiary
has the flexibility
not to alienate, but to promise to alienate, his
27
interest.
Yet, these methods may not satisfy creditors and others
acting to reach the beneficiary's interest. First, the creditor may
not be willing to wait to receive the beneficiary's interest under a
promise by the beneficiary. For example, if the creditor received,
in the alternative, a court judgment against the beneficiary's
interest, the creditor would have the opportunity to borrow
against the judgment. Such a judgment, however, is not possible
against a spendthrift trust. Second, with only a promise by the
beneficiary to pay, the creditor might have to chase the beneficiary and her money or attempt to snare the money just as it is
distributed to the beneficiary. 2 Third, under these methods the
creditor does not stand as a beneficiary to the trust, with all of a
beneficiary's powers to compel a trustee to obey the terms of the
trust. 29 Even if the creditor were able to enforce the
beneficiary's right to an interest in a spendthrift trust, the creditor could do no better than hold the trustee to the terms of the
trust. The spendthrift provision would bar the creditor from
assigning her interest, or hastening the distributions from the

Effect of a Trust on the Eligibility or Liability of the Trust Beneficiary for Public
Assistance, 26 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 133, 144-46 (1991).
23. PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO THE LAW OF TRUSTS 32 (1975).
24. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 152 cmt. j.
25. Id.
26. John P. Ludington, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Beneficiary's
Arrangement for Payment to Another, As They Become Due, of Sums Due Under
Spendthrift Trust, 83 A.L.R.3D 1142, 1143 (1978).
27. Id.
28. Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2 (1995).
29. See HASKELL, supra note 23, at 125.
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trustee.
Thus, a spendthrift provision practically requires that the
creditor bring successive actions against the beneficiary after
each distribution, and each action will reach only the distributed
amount. As compared with the transaction costs of a single action by a creditor to gain the right to receive distributions directly from the trust, the pragmatic effect of the spendthrift trust is
to make recovery impracticable and too costly. ° Moreover, when
multiple creditors wish to reach the beneficiary's interest, determining which creditor's claim should take priority against the
beneficiary's interest after distribution may create confusion. The
spendthrift provision thus frustrates the satisfaction of worthy
claims.
B. History of Spendthrift Trusts
1. Early History of Spendthrift Trusts in the United States
Courts in the United States generally adopted the English
courts' resistance to restraints on the alienation of equitable
interests3 1 until the late 19th century, 32 yet spendthrift trusts
1

30. But see In re Marriage of Becker, 858 P.2d 480, 483 (Or. Ct. App. 1993)
(ordering the beneficiary to pay a certain sum to the creditor on the date of distribution from the trust, not directing that the beneficiary's interest itself would satisfy
the claim).
31.
The original idea behind spendthrift trusts arose to protect the beneficiary
not from herself or her creditors, but from her family. The predecessor of the spendthrift trust protected married women's property from the influence and pressures of
their husbands. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 4, § 221, at 374; GRISWOLD, supra
note 1, at 10; Willard M. Bushman, The (In)Validity of Spendthrift Trusts, 47 OR. L.
REV. 304, 305 (1968). In the 18th century English social structure, husbands often
exercised complete control of property acquired independently by their wives. Bushman, supra, at 305. The Court of Chancery, knowing that a wife might be compelled
by her husband to relinquish control of her property, began to approve of trust provisions disallowing the alienation of the wife's interest. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note
4, § 221, at 374. However, the English courts never went beyond the "special case"
protecting the property that married women acquired independently. Id. at 376. To
this day, English law holds to the general tenet that equitable life interests, such as
a beneficiary would have in a spendthrift trust, are fully alienable. Id. English practitioners, unable to extend spendthrift trusts beyond the protection of the property of
married women, developed discretionary, blended, and protective trusts to protect and
control the beneficiary's interest. Id. at 376-80.
32.
Bushman, supra note 31, at 306 (noting the acceptance of the English rule
by early American courts, and the first American treatise on trusts in 1872); see,
e.g., Nichols v. Levy, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 433 (1866):
It is a settled rule of law that the beneficial interest of the cestui que trust,
whatever it may be, is liable for the payment of his debts. It cannot be so
fenced about by inhibitions and restrictions as to secure to it the inconsistent characteristics of right and enjoyment to the beneficiary and immunity
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had appeared by procedural happenstance in Pennsylvania during that period.33 Early in the 1800s, the courts of Pennsylvania
had no equity powers; therefore, the interest of the beneficiary
was safe from creditors for the simple reason that creditors could
not pursue an action at law against an equitable interest in a
trust.34 By the time that the Pennsylvania courts acquired equity powers, spendthrift trusts were entrenched, and courts in
other states routinely cited Pennsylvania cases in deciding
spendthrift issues.35
This Pennsylvania law was subsequently cited in what has
been, perhaps, the most influential dictum in the history of
American trust law: the statement in Nichols v. Eaton31 of United States Supreme Court Justice Miller. Despite its faulty use of
precedent, the Nichols dictum gained attention, and many oth-

from his creditors.
Id. at 441.
33. GRISWOLD, supra note 1, § 26, at 21.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 22.
36. 91 U.S. 716 (1875). Justice Miller wrote:
We do not see . . . that the power of alienation is a necessary incident to a
life-estate in real property, or that the rents and profits of real property
and the interest and dividends of personal property may not be enjoyed by
an individual without liability for his debts being attached as a necessary
incident to such enjoyment. This doctrine is one which the English Chancery Court has ingrafted upon the common law for the benefit of creditors,
and is comparatively of modern origin. We concede that there are limitations which public policy or general statutes impose upon all dispositions of
property, such as those designed to prevent perpetuities and accumulations
of real estate in corporations and ecclesiastical bodies. We also admit that
there is a just and sound policy peculiarly appropriate to the jurisdiction of
courts of equity to protect creditors against frauds upon their rights, where
they be actual or constructive frauds. But the doctrine, that the owner of
property, in the free exercise of his will in disposing of it, cannot so dispose
of it, but that the object of his bounty, who parts with nothing in return,
must hold it subject to the debts due his creditors, though that may soon
deprive him of all the benefits sought to be conferred by the testator's affection or generosity, is one which we are not prepared to announce as the
doctrine of this court.
Id. at 725.
37. Unfortunately, Justice Miller erred in explaining spendthrift trusts on two
counts. First, the English chancery courts did not defend the alienability of the
beneficiary's interest to aid creditors, but to continue the parallel to the doctrine of
the alienability of legal interests. IIA AUSTIN W. SCOIrr & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 152, at 85-86 (4th ed. 1987). Second, the view of the chancery courts, that a beneficiary's interest should be alienable, was not of comparatively
modern origin, but had existed for centuries. GRISWOLD, supra note 1, §§ 3-5; GRAY,
supra note 19, § 168, at 161-62. For an enlightening discussion of philosophical tensions within 19th century property law, see Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand
and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1985).
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er state courts adopted Justice Miller's argument.3 8 The most
renowned critic of spendthrift trusts, Professor John C. Gray,
railed against the spread of spendthrift trusts in his Restraints
on the Alienation of Property.9 However, by the second edition
of his book in 1895, only twenty years after Nichols, eight states
upheld spendthrift trusts, and four more states had discussed
them favorably.4 ° After Gray's time, the premiere treatise on
spendthrift trusts was the work of Erwin N. Griswold,4 a Dean
of the Harvard Law School, who first collected and cataloged
spendthrift trust law in 1936.42 By then, only nine states had
not spoken on spendthrift trusts.' Of the remaining states,
Griswold found only ten states that did not recognize these
trusts, at least to some extent." Today, 43 jurisdictions accept
in some way the validity of spendthrift trusts.4 5
Current commentators continue to debate the policies of
spendthrift trusts, generally calling for less use of spendthrift
trusts and an increase in the exceptions to spendthrift trusts.4
Courts continue to struggle with spendthrift trusts, confusing
them with other trusts,4 v or wrestling with the thorny policy
dilemma spendthrift trusts create." Likewise, legislatures in

38.
IIA Scowr & FRATCHER, supra note 37, § 152, at 86.
39.
GRAY, supra note 19, at iii-xii, 246-47.
40.
ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFr TRUSTS 32-33 (1936).
41.
Id.
42. Id. A second edition of Spendthrift Trusts was published in 1947.
43.
GRISWOLD, supra note 40, § 53.
44. Id. § 56, at 44. Griswold's research included the jurisdictions of Alaska,
Hawaii, and the District of Columbia.
45.
See infra notes 86-120 and accompanying text; see also BOGERT & BOGERT,
supra note 4, § 222, n.59. But see MISs. CODE ANN. § 89-1-43 (1972); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 498:8 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-115 (1991). Currently, the laws of
Alaska, Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming do not declare spendthrift trusts either valid or
invalid.
46.
See, e.g., Anne S. Emanuel, Spendthrift Trusts: It's Time to Codify the Compromise, 72 NEB. L. REV. 179 (1993); Carolyn L. Dessin, Feed a Trust and Starve a
Child: The Effectiveness of Trust Protective Techniques Against Claims for Support
And Alimony, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 691 (1994). One scholar defends spendthrift
trusts by analyzing their psychological impact on the beneficiary and their financial
impact on the credit market, concluding that spendthrift trusts are necessary and
valid. Hirsch, supra note 28. But see Bushman, supra note 31, at 315-17.
47.
See, e.g., Domo v. McCarthy, 612 N.E.2d 706, 709 (Ohio 1993) (confusing a
spendthrift provision with a provision actually triggering a protective trust); Payer v.
Orgill, 191 N.E.2d 373 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1963) (confusing spendthrift provisions with
discretionary and support provisions and provisions creating a protective trust).
48.
See, e.g., Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1082-84 (Ohio
1991) (denying creditor from reaching beneficiary's trust interest in a bankruptcy
proceeding); Parscal v. Parscal, 196 Cal. Rptr. 462, 465-66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (preferring child support enforcement over protection of pension benefits); Wife, J.B.G. v.
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most states have adopted unique statutes addressing spendthrift
trusts, seemingly attempting to answer a particular question, yet
leaving open many issues pertaining to these trusts.49
2. Montana's Spendthrift Trust History
a. The First Statutes
Montana has its own unique spendthrift trust history.
Montana's original spendthrift trust statutes" can be traced to
1828 New York statutes. 5' These statutes were part of a massive reform of property law in New York. 52 Although the New
York legislature intended to abolish all trusts of real property, it
decided to allow the restraint on alienation for amounts necessary to educate and support the beneficiary.5 3 These statutes
were later included in the "Field Code" that was adopted in California.5' When Montana enacted its first spendthrift trust statutes in 1895, it used California's statutes as a model.55
Montana's statutes were slightly different from both the New

Husband, P.J.G., 286 A.2d 256, 259 (Del. Ch. 1971) (ordering that spouse support
payments be made from spendthrift trust income). See generally C. R. McCorkle,
Annotation, Validity of Spendthrift Trusts, 34 A.L.R.2D 1335 (1954) (summarizing
case law decisions concerning spendthrift trusts).
49. See, e.g., 20 PA_ STAT. ANN. § 6103(a) (1975 & Supp. 1995) (allowing the
income of a beneficiary of a spendthrift trust to release his interest if the result
would pass his interest to a descendant of the beneficiary); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19
(Michie 1995) (allowing creditors to reach the beneficiary's interest in excess of
$500,000).
50. The relevant sections of the Revised Codes of Montana provided:
6788. Profits of land liable to creditors in certain cases. When a trust
is created to receive the rents and profits of real property, and no valid
direction for accumulation is given, the surplus of such rents and profits,
beyond the sum that may be necessary for the education and support of the
persons for whose benefit the trust is created, is liable to the claims of the
creditors of such a person, in the same manner as personal property which
cannot be reached by execution.
6794. Transfer by beneficiary of interest in trust forbidden. The beneficiary of a trust for the receipt of the rents and profits of real property, or
for the payment of an annuity out of such rents and profits, cannot transfer
or in any manner dispose of his interest in such trust.
REV. CODES MONT. §§ 6788, 6794 (1921), quoted in GRISWOLD, supra note 1, § 199.
51. GRISWOLD, supra note 1, § 199.
52. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 210-12 (1973).
53. Alexander, supra note 37, at 1199.
54. GRISWOLD, supra note 1, § 76.
55. Id. § 199; see also Andrew P. Morriss, -This State Will Soon Have Plenty of
Laws--Lessons From One Hundred Years of Codification in Montana, 56 MONT. L.
REV. 359 (1995); Robert G. Natelson, Running with the Land in Montana, 51 MONT.
L. REV. 17, 42 (1990).
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York and the California statutes. Unlike California, Montana did
not require that the trust instrument expressly authorize a
spendthrift trust to create a spendthrift trust; rather, every trust
for the profits and rents from real property automatically created
a spendthrift trust.5" Unlike New York,5" Montana governed
only trusts for real property; the statutes did not mention trusts
of personal property. In sum, the original Montana statutes
defined spendthrift trusts only as to rents and profits from real
property, and, even then, the statutes explicitly protected only
amounts necessary to support and educate the beneficiary. The
law was silent regarding other applications for spendthrift protection, e.g., trusts of personal property.
b. Court Interpretationof the First Statutes
After adoption of the statutes, nearly a century passed before the Montana Supreme Court discussed spendthrift trusts or
the spendthrift statutes. In 1985, the Montana Supreme Court
5 In Lundgren, a testamentary
decided Lundgren v. Hoglund."
trust of personal property with a spendthrift provision59 directed that two-thirds of the trust income go to the beneficiary
during his life."° The beneficiary assigned his share to his creditors to satisfy certain unsecured loans.6 ' When the creditors
sought the beneficiary's share prior to payment by the trustee,
the trustee refused them, relying on the spendthrift provision.62
The district court ordered the trustee to pay the beneficiary's
income to the creditors.63 The Montana Supreme Court adopted
the common law of other states, held "spendthrift provisions to
be valid in Montana," and unanimously reversed the lower
court."
The court in Lundgren relied on Minnesota and Wisconsin
decisions65 to find Montana's statute6" applied only to real

56. GRISWOLD, supra note 1, § 76.
57. The New York statute had since been revised to allow restraints on a
beneficiary's interest in personal property, as well as real property. Id. § 69.
58. 219 Mont. 295, 711 P.2d 809 (1985).
59. See supra text accompanying note 13.
60. Lundgren, 219 Mont. at 297, 711 P.2d at 810.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 297, 711 P.2d at 811.
64. Id. at 299-300, 711 P.2d at 812.
65. Lundgren, 219 Mont. at 301-02, 711 P.2d at 813 (citing In re Schmidt's
Will, 97 N.W.2d 441 (Minn. 1959)); In re Moulton's Estate, 46 N.W.2d 667 (Minn.
1951); Erickson v. Erickson, 267 N.W. 426 (Minn. 1936); Lamberton v. Pereles, 58
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property."7 In Lundgren, the property in question was entirely
personal property. The court relied on a California decision to
find that the phrase in the statute, "valid direction for accumulation,"68 applied only to "unexpended portions of income."69 The
trust instrument in Lundgren had a valid direction that the
accumulation should be added to the principal. Thus, the court
found that Montana's spendthrift statute did not apply to the
trust."0 Nevertheless, the court found that the creditors could
not reach the beneficiary's interest in the trust, because the
court had already adopted the common law recognizing
spendthrift trusts.
In sum, the Lundgren decision significantly expanded spendthrift trust doctrine in Montana. The Lundgren holding allowed
not only spendthrift trusts for real property, but also spendthrift
trusts of personal property. The court did not limit spendthrift
trusts in any way or to any purpose. 7 '
3. The 1989 Revision of Montana's Spendthrift Statutes
In the 1989 session, the Montana legislature thoroughly
rewrote Montana's trust statutes, 2 including the spendthrift

N.W. 776 (Wis. 1894)).
66.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-24-210 (1983) (replacing REV. CODES MONT. § 6788).
See supra note 50 for the text of this statute.
67. Lundgren, 219 Mont. at 301, 711 P.2d at 813.
68. Lundgren, 219 Mont. at 301-02, 711 P.2d at 813 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 72-24-210 (1985)).
69. Lundgren, 219 Mont. at 302, 711 P.2d at 813 (citing In re Estate of Lawrence, 72 Cal. Rptr. 851, 854-55 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968)).
70. Lundgren, 219 Mont. at 302, 711 P.2d at 813.
71.
One year after Lundgren, in In re Anderson, 43 St. Rep. 1861 (Bankr. D.
Mont. 1986), a Montana bankruptcy court distinguished a debtor's interest in a Montana Public Employee's Retirement System fund (which contained a spendthrift provision) from a traditional spendthrift trust that would have been valid under
Lundgren. Id. at 1867. The court found specifically that, unlike a traditional spendthrift trust, the debtor had partially funded the trust and could control benefits by
terminating his employment. Id. The court further found that the retirement fund
was not excluded from the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C § 541(c)(2) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985), which excluded spendthrift trusts that were valid under state law.
Id. at 1864. Note that the court's interpretation, that ERISA pension funds were included in the bankruptcy estate, was later overturned by the United States Supreme
Court decision in Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992). See supra note 21 and
accompanying text.
72. Notwithstanding this Comment's specific criticism of the spendthrift trust
statutes adopted in 1989, the members of the committee that created the 1989 revisions deserve great credit. The legislation clarified and improved significantly
Montana's other trust laws. The goals of the trust law revisions were to update the
language, reorganize the statutes, and eliminate inconsistencies. Hearings on S.B. 333
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trust statutes.73 The new statutes extended spendthrift trust
protection to trusts of personal property. Also, the new statute
prevented creditors from accessing any of the beneficiary's interest protected by a spendthrift provision, not only that "sum necessary for the education and support of the beneficiary" as the
old statute declared. Thus, the new statutes significantly expanded the parameters of protection available through the use of
spendthrift trusts, reflecting the broader acceptance of spendthrift trusts seen in the Lundgren decision.
The 1989 revisions recognized the validity of restraints on
alienation of a beneficiary's interest in income74 and principal.7 5 At the same time, the legislature, in effect, converted all
those trusts "for the education and support of a beneficiary" into
spendthrift trusts.7 6 Thus, under Montana law, every support

Before the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 51st Mont. Leg. (February 10, 1989)
(statement by sponsor, Sen. Joe Mazurek); Hearings on S.B. 333 Before the House
Comm. on Judiciary, 51st Mont. Leg. (March 8, 1989); see also Committee Strives to
Remedy Trust Law Inequities, MONTANA LAWYER, Dec. 1987, at 5-6.
73.
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-33-301 to -306 (1989), enacted §§ 24-29, Ch. 685,
L. 1989.
74. Section 72-33-301 of the Montana Code provides:
Restraint on transfer of income. Except as provided in 72-33-305, if the
trust instrument provides that a beneficiary's interest is not subject to voluntary or involuntary transfer, the beneficiary's interest in income under
the trust may not be transferred and is not subject to enforcement of a
money judgment until paid to the beneficiary.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-33-301 (1995). Section 72-33-305 concerns spendthrift trusts
to which the trustor becomes a beneficiary.
75. Section 72-33-302 of the Montana Code provides:
Restraint on transfer of principal. (1) Except as provided in 72-33-305 and
subsection (2) of this section, if the trust instrument provides that a
beneficiary's interest in principal is not subject to voluntary or involuntary
transfer, the beneficiary's interest in principal may not be transferred and
is not subject to enforcement of a money judgment until paid to the beneficiary.
2) After an amount of principal has become due and payable to the
beneficiary under the trust instrument, upon petition to the court by a
judgment creditor, the court may make an order directing the trustee to
satisfy the money judgment out of that principal amount. The court in its
discretion may issue an order directing the trustee to satisfy all or part of
the judgment out of that principal amount.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-33-302 (1995).
76. Section 72-33-303 of the Montana Code provides:
Trust for support. Except as provided in 72-33-305, if the trust instrument
provides that the trustee shall pay income or principal or both for the education or support of a beneficiary, the beneficiary's interest in income or
principal or both under the trust may not be transferred and is not subject
to the enforcement of a money judgment until paid to the beneficiary.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-33-303 (1995).
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trust is a spendthrift trust. Further, the legislature validated
discretionary trusts 7 and invalidated so-called "self-settled"
spendthrift trusts.78 The 1989 Montana Legislature also ensured that if a beneficiary disclaimed or renounced his interest
in a spendthrift trust, that disclaimer or renunciation would not
be considered a void "transfer" of interest under the spendthrift
trust statutes. 9
Prior to the 1989 revision, all trusts relating to the profits or
rents from real property were spendthrift trusts for the amount
needed to support and educate the beneficiary." After the revision, a settlor may create a spendthrift trust concerning real or
personal property only if the settlor expresses so in the trust
instrument.8 ' Because standard practice prior to the revision
had been to include a spendthrift provision, this requirement
imposed no significant burden upon trust drafters. However,
under the 1989 revisions, a beneficiary can transfer, and creditors can reach, any interest of a beneficiary if the trust is without a disabling provision.
The legislative drafters took the language of many of the
1989 statutes directly from California's probate code.82 However, the drafters omitted many of the exceptions to spendthrift
trusts within the California code.8" Montana's decision to adopt
77. The pertinent language of section 72-33-304 of the Montana Code is:
(1) If the trust instrument provides that the trustee shall pay to . . . the
beneficiary so much . . . as the trustee is the trustee's discretion sees fit to
pay, a transferee or creditor of the beneficiary may not compel the trustee
to pay any amount that may be paid only in the exercise of the trustee's
discretion.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-33-304 (1995). See generally infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
78. MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-33-305 (1995). A self-settled trust simply describes a
trust in which the trustor becomes a beneficiary of the trust he creates.
79. Section 72-33-306 of the Montana Code states: "Disclaimer not a transfer. A
disclaimer or renunciation by a beneficiary of all or part of his interest under a trust
shall not be considered a transfer under 72-33-301 or 72-33-302." MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 72-33-306 (1995).
80. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-24-205 (1987) (stating that any transfers by
the beneficiary of such a trust were forbidden); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-24-210 (1987)
(stating that the amount necessary for support and education of the beneficiary was
protected); Lundgren v. Hoglund, 219 Mont. 295, 301, 711 P.2d 809, 813 (1985).
81. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-33-301 to -302 (1995). For the text of these
statutes, see supra notes 74-75.
82. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-33-301 to -306 (1989) were drawn from CAL. PROB.
CODE §§ 15300-15306 (West 1987). MONT. CODE ANN. (Annotations) §§ 72-33-301 to 306 Official Comments (1994). Note that under CAL. PROB. CODE § 15307 (West
1991) all interest in a spendthrift trust beyond that amount necessary for the support and education of the beneficiary may be reached by judgment creditors.
83.
The omissions were noted in the official comments to section 72-33-301 of
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California's code without its exceptions is more than just of historical interest. Very few states allow such unfettered use of
spendthrift trusts. The 1989 revision placed Montana in a class
of only six states with spendthrift statutes that do not impose
some limit on spendthrift trusts."'
The Montana Supreme Court has yet to interpret the statutes adopted in 1989.85 A likely issue that the court will have to
address in the near future is whether a spendthrift trust is valid
against a claim that is compelling for policy reasons. The courts
and legislatures in other states have limited spendthrift trusts
when faced with such claims. The next section addresses the
exceptions to spendthrift trusts in other states.
C. CurrentLaw of Spendthrift Trusts
Although numerous states quickly embraced spendthrift
trusts, many of those same states have since restricted the application of spendthrift trusts and redefined their scope.86 Courts
and legislatures in other states accept spendthrift trusts as valid
but deny their application in particular situations." The most

the Montana Code:
However, the corresponding California section is subject to exceptions for
claims for child and spousal support, claims for reimbursement of public
support, the right of general creditors to reach maximum of one-fourth of
payments due beneficiary, and income in excess of the amount needed for
education and support. None of these exceptions are applicable in Montana.
Similarly, this section differs from section 157 of the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts (1957) which enumerates four classes of claimants who
may enforce their claims against the beneficiary's interest in such a trust.
MONT. CODE ANN. (Annotations) § 72-33-301 Official Comments (1994). The official
comments provide no explanation as to why the legislative drafters adopted
California's statutes without including the exceptions.
84.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3536(a) (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-2
(Burns 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-9-4 (Michie Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 189.1-1 (1988); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.035 (West 1995). Rhode Island only recently recognized spendthrift trusts after a long history of prohibiting them. As yet, no
exceptions to spendthrift trusts have developed in Rhode Island.
85. But cf. In re Ullman, 116 B.R. 228, 231 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990) (finding a
self-settled spendthrift trust did not qualify as a valid spendthrift trust and citing
Lundgren v. Hoglund, 219 Mont. 295, 711 P.2d 809 (1985), but not mentioning
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-33-305 (1985), which expressly barred self-settled spendthrift
trusts).
86.
Hirsch, supra note 28, at 73.
87.
For example, some states have not allowed a spendthrift trust to insulate
the beneficiary's interest in excess of a certain amount. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §
55-19(B) (Michie 1995) (insulating the beneficiary's interest not exceeding $500,000);
see also Hirsch, supra note 28, at 75. Other states have allowed protective provisions
only for certain purposes. See, e.g. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-321(a) (West 1993)
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prevalent exceptions address the type of claim that may be satisfied despite the spendthrift provision. These exceptions fall into
seven categories:
1) claims arising against a spendthrift trust in which the
trustor is one of the beneficiaries;"
2) claims arising from services provided to the trust interest of the beneficiary; 89
3) claims by the government;"
4) claims for the support of the beneficiary's children or
spouse, including alimony;9'
5) claims arising from services provided to the beneficia92
ry;

ry.

94

6) claims arising from a tort by the beneficiary;93 and
7) claims arising from general contracts with the beneficia-

These categories are ranked roughly in order of acceptance by
other states, with the first being the most widely recognized. 95
The most prevalent exception to spendthrift trusts denies
self-settled trusts: the trustor cannot create a spendthrift trust
for himself as protection against his creditors. 96 All jurisdictions
have this prohibition of self-settled spendthrift trusts.9 7 The

(protecting only trusts for support); N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-03-10 (1995) (protecting
only sums necessary to educate and support the beneficiary). Still other states have
not allowed the spendthrift trusts to protect certain types of interest, e.g., the corpus
of the trust. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2404 (1994) (protecting only interest in
trust income from real property); see also Hirsch, supra note 28, at 74.
88. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 156; see also infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
89. HA ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 37, § 157.3; see also infra notes 101-03
and accompanying text.
90. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 157(a); see also infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
91. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 157(a); see also infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
92. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 157(b); see also infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
93. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 4, § 224; see also infra notes 115-17 and
accompanying text.
94. Emanuel, supra note 46, at 198; see also infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
95. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 4, § 224.
96. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 156; BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 4, § 223;
see, e.g., Speed v. Speed, 430 S.E.2d 348, 348-49 (Ga. 1993) (holding self-settled
trusts invalid); In re Ullman, 116 B.R. 228, 231 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990) (holding that
it is essential in the creation of a spendthrift trust that the settlor and the beneficiary be different persons).
97.
Hirsch, supra note 28, at 83.
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rationale for disallowing the settlor to create a spendthrift trust
with himself as a beneficiary is obvious: a settlor should not be
able to prevent his creditors from pursuing collection on debts
that the settlor incurred.9" Although one commentator recently
proposed relaxing this standard to allow self-settled spendthrift
trusts,9 9 the rule barring the self-settled spendthrift trust seems
deeply embedded in trust law.' 0
Second, a widely-recognized exception to spendthrift trusts is
for claims arising from services provided to the trust interest. °1 Included in this category are claims by the trustee for
the trustee's services and fees for attorneys who have worked to
represent, defend or enforce the trust interest. °2 One rationale
for this exception is that the persons who serve the beneficiary's
interest should be compensated for their efforts, and that to
ignore their claims would unjustly enrich the trust.0 3
The third of the seven types of exceptions to spendthrift
trusts addresses claims by the government. For example, any
state law permitting the protection of a beneficiary's interest
cannot prevent a federal tax lien from reaching the beneficiary's
interest."0 4 One commentator describes the rationale for this
sort of claim as "not based on public policy, but rather on legal
impossibility.""' It is surprising that relatively few states have
statutes authorizing the attachment of a spendthrift trust
beneficiary's interest to satisfy a state tax obligation." 6

98.
BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 4, § 223.
99.
Hirsch, supra note 28, at 84-92 (comparing the spendthrift trust's restraint
against voluntary alienation by the beneficiary to other self-disabling restraints, e.g.,
pension funds and savings accounts).
100. GRISWOLD, supra note 1, § 557.
101.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 157 cmt. d. See generally 11A SCOTT &
FRATCHER, supra note 37, § 157.3.
102. See IIA SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 37, § 157.3; see also RESTATEMENT,
supra note 3, § 244.
103. See, e.g., Evans & Luptak v. Obolensky, 487 N.W.2d 521, 523 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1992) (allowing "attorneys to be paid for their services in enhancing the position of the beneficiary"), cited in Emanuel, supra note 46, at 196-97 n.89. But cf
Schreiber v. Kellogg, 50 F.3d 264, 277 (3rd Cir. 1995) (holding that an attorney
might not reach the beneficiary's interest for fees for services rendered, if the services do not actually benefit the beneficiary's interest).
104. See, e.g., In re Rosenberg, 199 N.E. 206 (N.Y. 1935), cert. den. 298 U.S. 669
(1936); Howard v. United States, 566 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn. 1978); see also I.R.C. §§
6321, 6331 (1988) (authorizing and executing a lien in favor of the U.S. on all present and future rights to real or personal property to satisfy tax liability). But see In
re Wilson, 140 B.R. 400 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992) (finding no property interest under
state law to which a federal tax lien could attach).
105.
BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 4, § 224, at 474.
106. State statutes allowing tax claims to reach a beneficiary's interest in a
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Fourth, an exception allows the beneficiary's interest to be
reached to satisfy claims arising from the support of the
beneficiary's children or spouse. 117 Two rationales support this
exception: (1) the duty to support is recognized by law' and
(2) the children and spouse should be considered as additional,
though unnamed, beneficiaries of the trust as a practical matter.0 9 The spendthrift trust interest is reached less frequently
to satisfy a spouse's claim for alimony."0
A fifth exception provides that the interest of a beneficiary
in a spendthrift trust may be reached to satisfy claims for services provided to the beneficiary as an individual, e.g., for the
beneficiary's necessary support or medical care."' Twenty-five
states have some form of this exception."' The rationale for
this exception is that the purpose of trusts is often to ensure the
health and support of beneficiaries, and any payments made to
further that purpose should be recovered by creditors."' However, the creditor usually can recover only where "circumstances
are such that it would have been an abuse of discretion by the
trustee to refuse to expend funds of the trust in procuring the
services or goods for the beneficiary.""'
Sixth, some states recognize an exception whereby the interest in a spendthrift trust may be reached to satisfy a claim arisspendthrift trust include only the following: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-7707(4)
(1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-28(c)(2) (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.180(6)(c)
(Baldwin 1989).
Also in the category of governmental claims are claims against the interest
held by beneficiaries who are non-citizens and are considered "enemies" of the United
States. The restraints against reaching an alien enemy's interest in a spendthrift
trust are not valid. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 157 cmt. f.
107.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 157 cmt. b. This exception is held as law in
27 states. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 4, § 224, at 456-69.
108. See, e.g., Albertson v. Ryder, 621 N.E.2d 480, 483 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
109. IIA Scor & FRATCHER, supra note 37, § 157.1, at 190-92; see, e.g., Howard
v. Spragins, 350 So. 2d 318, 322 (Ala. 1977); cf In re Bucklin's Estate, 51 N.W.2d
412, 416-17 (Iowa 1952).
110. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 4, § 224, at 465-67. Florida, Maryland, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, Louisiana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon,
and Texas allow alimony claims against an interest in a spendthrift trust. Id.; see
also MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.080 (Vernon 1992) (removing Missouri's exception to
spendthrift trusts for alimony claims, but leaving the exception for spousal support
claims valid).
111. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 4, § 224, at 469-72; see, e.g., In re Estate of
Dodge, 281 N.W.2d 447, 450-51 (Iowa 1979). But cf Department of Mental Health v.
Phillips, 500 N.E.2d 29, 33-34 (Ill.
1986) (holding that the state could not reach the
interest in a discretionary support trust if settlor intended otherwise).
112. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 4, § 224, at 469-72.
113. Emanuel, supra note 46, at 195.
114. IIA ScoTT & FRATCHER, supra note 37, § 157.2, at 203.
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ing from the tortious conduct of the beneficiary." 5 The rationale for this exception generally is that tort creditors are involuntary creditors."' Despite the general explosion of tort law
during this century, the exception to spendthrift trusts for tort
creditors has been accepted, surprisingly, in only three
states. 117
The seventh and last type of exception to spendthrift trusts
allows general creditors of the beneficiary to attach the
beneficiary's interest. Only California has such a law."' One
reason that only California has an exception for general judgment creditors is that many states already restrict the protection
afforded by spendthrift provisions to only part of the
beneficiary's interest, e.g., that amount needed for the support of
the beneficiary or, under some statutes, a specific dollar
amount." Because the beneficiary's interest is protected only
partially, general creditors may reach the portion which the law
leaves unprotected. The rationale for this exception has as much
to do with the policy of encouraging contracts as it does with the
traditional policy that encourages one to pay her debts."'
In opposition to these exceptions, the defenders of spendthrift trusts offer two policy arguments. First, the sanctity of the
settlor's intent should not be disturbed."' Arguably, courts and
legislatures should allow settlors to impose whatever terms they
wish upon the beneficiary for the trust interest they create. The
second reason is that the creditor of the beneficiary has no right

115.
Id. § 157.5.
116.
Id. One commentator advocated acceptance of the tort creditor exception and
compared it with tax law exclusions from income for tort damages, the general goals
of insurance law for the restoration of victims, and bankruptcy law restrictions
against the tortfeasor's discharge of tort damage debt in bankruptcy. Laurene M.
Brooks, Comment, A Tort Creditor Exception to the Spendthrift Trust Doctrine: A Call
to the Wisconsin Legislature, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 109, 133-41 (1989).
117.
The three states are California, Georgia and Louisiana. CAL. PROB. CODE §
15305.5 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995) (allowing court-ordered restitution for a felony or
damages from a felony to be satisfied out of the beneficiary's interest); GA. CODE
ANN. § 53-12-28(c)(1) (1995) ("tort judgments"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:2005(3) (West
1991) ("offense or quasi-offense"); see BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 4, § 224. See
generally William N. Antonis, Note, Spendthrift Trusts: Attachability of a Beneficiary's
Interest in Satisfaction of a Tort Claim, 28 NOTRE DAME LAw. 509 (1953); Weston C.
Overholt, Jr., Note, Tort Liability of the Beneficiary of a Spendthrift Trust, 57 DICK.
L. REV. 220 (1953).
118.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 15306.5 (West 1991) (allowing court to order trustee to
satisfy "judgment creditors" with up to 25 percent of the beneficiary's interest).
119.
See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
120.
Emanuel, supra note 46, at 198.
121.
Id.
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to expect his claim to be satisfied out of the beneficiary's interest. The creditor had no claim to it before the trust was created,
and his actual or constructive notice of the beneficiary's interest
in the trust under the spendthrift clause bars his later claim.' 2
For these reasons, the proponents of spendthrift trusts resist any
exceptions beyond the exception for self-settled spendthrift
trusts.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Spendthrift Trusts and Policy
Spendthrift trusts are creatures of policy. Allowing the
settlor's intent to control completely is no more inherently logical
(or just) than demanding financial accountability from a beneficiary. An analogous balance is played out in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy courts balance the rights of creditors with the policy interest in ensuring a "fresh start" for the applicant.' Because
spendthrift trusts are creatures of policy, courts, legislators and
scholars should subject spendthrift trusts to recurring analysis.
The age-old question of spendthrift trusts should be answered
periodically in light of current economic and political needs of
individuals and communities.
The time has arrived to reconsider Montana's spendthrift
trust law. Nearly every state that has adopted spendthrift trust
protection for beneficiaries has also imposed exceptions to that
protection.' 2 ' Montana has none of the usual exceptions to
spendthrift trusts, other than the bar on self-settled spendthrift
trusts. The policy dilemma posed by spendthrift trusts requires
exceptions to balance the intent of the settlor with the valid
claims of creditors. The history of spendthrift trusts in the United States makes clear that spendthrift trusts have rarely been
absolute; nor should they be. Montana law should reflect the
commonly held exceptions."2
Moreover, exceptions to spendthrift trusts do not particularly disrespect a settlor's intent. Other examples exist which show
a settlor's right to distribute is not unrestricted. The rule against
perpetuities, 6 the spouse's elective share of an estate,' and
122. Emanuel, supra note 46, at 192-93 (citing Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716,
726-27 (1875)); see, e.g., Lundgren v. Hoglund, 219 Mont. 295, 300, 711 P.2d 809, 812
(1985); cf. Bushman, supra note 31, at 315-16.
123. See Karns, supra note 21.
124. See supra notes 96-120 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
126. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-2-1001 to -1005 (1995).
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restrictions against illegal trusts'2 8 demonstrate that the direc-

tion of a settlor's intent can be changed by outside policies. 9
Another example is that Montana historically limited the
amount that could be given in trust for charitable purposes. 3 °
Thus, although Montana courts defer regularly to the settlor's
expressed intent,'31 the settlor's intent should not be considered
sacred. 132

B. Alternatives to Spendthrift Trusts
Limiting spendthrift trusts with exceptions does not necessarily hamper the settlor's intent to provide for the beneficiary.
The primary goals for creating a spendthrift trust can be served
by other types of trust provisions. The discretionary trust and
the support trust are examples of alternative types of trusts
which, like the spendthrift trust, allow the settlor to protect the
beneficiary's interest.
A discretionary trust subjects the beneficiary's interest in
income or principal to the discretion of the trustee, to the extent
that discretion is directed by the settlor." Unlike the spendthrift trust, in which the beneficiary can sue to enforce the terms
of the trust, a beneficiary of a discretionary trust may not contest the reasonable discretion of the trustee."M One should note
that the spendthrift and discretionary provisions may be combined in the same trust to provide extra insulation for the trust
assets from alienation by the beneficiary.'35
127.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-221 (1995).
128. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-33-204, -411 (1995).
129.
GRISWOLD, supra note 1, § 553; HASKELL, supra note 23, at 50-60.
130.
GRISWOLD, supra note 1, § 553, at 632 (citing REV. CODES MONT. § 7015
(1921)).
131.
For a recent example, note In re Estate of Lindgren, 268 Mont. 96, 100,
885 P.2d 1280, 1282 (1994) (stating "[the [c]ourt should determine the testator's
intent, the ruling concern, by analyzing the will in its entirety ....
") (emphasis added).
132. See Alexander, supra note 37, at 1266.
133. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 155.
134. Id. § 155 cmt. b; see, e.g., In re Tone's Estates, 39 N.W.2d 401, 406 (Iowa
1949) (denying the beneficiary's request for an order requiring the trustee of a discretionary trust to advance funds to cover the beneficiary's attorney fees). Of course,
if a settlor tied the trustee's discretion to some standard, e.g., the support of the
beneficiary, a court may enforce the standard. See, e.g., Martin v. Martin, 374 N.E.2d
1384, 1389-90 (Ohio 1978) (holding that a trustee may be required to distribute to
meet the standards of care of the beneficiary, despite term granting "absolute discretion" to trustee). Also, the beneficiary may bring a claim for an abuse of discretion
by the trustee. See generally HASKELL, supra note 23, at 33.
135.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 155; see, e.g., Canfield v. Security-First Natl
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Discretionary trusts, by tying distribution of the
beneficiary's interest to the discretion of the trustee, protect the
beneficiary's interest from both voluntary and involuntary alienation. Of course, the settlor may hesitate to give the discretion to
the trustee.'3 6 The settlor may also hesitate to use a discretionary trust because the beneficiary could still seize the
beneficiary's interest in a litigated claim of abuse of discretion.
Still, one can imagine few situations where a discretionary trust
would not accomplish the same ends as a spendthrift trust, especially if the discretionary trust also includes a support standard,
which would require the trustee to make distributions to ensure
a prescribed level of support for the beneficiary.'3 7
The other alternative type of trust is the support trust, in
which the trustee distributes trust funds as necessary to ensure
the support of the beneficiary. 3 ' Under a typical support trust,
the beneficiary normally receives no more than is necessary for
support, and does not have the power to assign her interest in
the trust."9 Unlike the spendthrift trust, where the
beneficiary's interest is shielded simply by the nature of the
trust device, the interest of the beneficiary in a support trust is
protected by the purpose the trust is meant to serve, i.e., the
support of the beneficiary."4 The settlor directs the trustee to
distribute only for the support of the beneficiary. Any attachment by creditors or assignment by the beneficiary is contrary to
the settlor's intent and is void.' Thus, the support trust is a
more focused tool than the spendthrift trust, yet is subject to
challenge by third parties who bring claims allegedly arising
from the necessary support of the beneficiary.
The discretionary and support trust alternatives 42 allow
Bank, 87 P.2d 830, 834 (Cal. 1939).
136. The strength of the discretionary trust is its complete insulation of the
trust from any claim not approved by the trustee. Yet, this is also the discretionary
trust's weakness. Possibly contrary to the settlor's motive, the trustee may distribute
too much or may deny any distribution whatever to the beneficiary. Emanuel, supra
note 46, at 186.
137. See In re Estate of Lindgren, 268 Mont. 96, 885 P.2d 1280 (1994).
138. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 154. Note that there are at least two variations of the amount of distribution: the distribution could be set at whatever amount
is necessary, or at a certain amount for the expressed purpose of support. GRISWOLD,
supra note 1, § 430.
139. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 154; GRISWOLD, supra note 1, § 431; BOGERT
& BOGERT, supra note 4, § 229; see, e.g., Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Crosby, 254
P.2d 732, 739-40 (Wash. 1953) (holding that the trustee was not required to distribute according to the terms of the property settlement in the beneficiary's divorce).
140. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 154 cmt. b.
141.
See In re Keeler's Estate, 3 A.2d 413, 416-17 (Pa. 1939).
142.
Another alternative type of trust is the protective trust. Protective trusts
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the settlor to insulate the beneficiary's interest from creditors
and from possible abuse of the interest by the beneficiary. In this
way, they are identical to spendthrift trusts. These trust alternatives are also recognized by Montana law." A settlor may not
wish to use the alternatives because they grant too much discretion to the trustee, but that discretion is the exact means of
protecting the beneficiary's interest.'"
Because the distribution under the alternatives is entirely
discretionary and protected by statute, creditors and the beneficiary have no interest to alienate. This is in direct contrast to
the spendthrift trust, which bars alienation of a beneficiary's
specifically-defined interest. No policy dilemma exists under the
alternatives to spendthrift trusts. The settlor relinquishes real
control to the trustee under the alternatives. The beneficiary,
too, is subject to the trustee's discretion.
Although the alternatives do not provide the "absolute" protection of spendthrift trust, the "absolute" protection of a spendthrift trust is a misperception. The law is written in absolute
terms, but lessons from other states indicate that Montana practitioners may be surprised to find their spendthrift trusts invaded. Courts and legislators have consistently created exceptions
for policy reasons.'"

impose a restrictive condition upon the beneficiary, with the intent to protect the
beneficiary's interest. If attempts are made to alienate the beneficiary's interest,
either by the beneficiary or a third party, the beneficiary's interest forfeits from an
absolute right, to an interest in a discretionary trust. See Domo v. McCarthy, 612
N.E.2d 706, 709 (Ohio 1993); HASKELL, supra note 23, at 39-40. In some protective
trusts, the beneficiary's interest is completely forfeited, and is not replaced by a discretionary trust interest. Hirsch, supra note 28, at 2 n.5. Protective trusts are most
often seen in trusts governed by English law. See supra note 31 and accompanying
text. They are used less often by settlors in the United States because spendthrift
trusts are available, and possibly because the result of the protective trust subjects
the beneficiary's interest to the trustee's discretion.
The protective trust is similar to the spendthrift trust because the beneficiary
and third parties are restrained from alienating the beneficiary's interest. Dessin,
supra note 46, at 699. The interest of the beneficiary in a spendthrift trust is defined and not subject to the discretion of the trustee. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text. In a protective trust, the beneficiary's interest becomes subject to
the trustee's discretion if the beneficiary or a third party attempts alienation of the
interest. However, until such an attempt is made, the trust is not a discretionary
trust. The trustee must simply implement the terms of the trust.
143.
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-33-303 to -304 (1995). Note that a protective trust
would operate as a discretionary trust under § 72-33-304 after an attempt at alienation of the beneficiary's interest. See supra note 142.
144. See, e.g., In re Estate of Lindgren, 268 Mont. 96, 885 P.2d 1280 (1994).
145. See supra notes 96-120 and accompanying text.
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C. The Spendthrift Statutes Contradict Other Montana Statutes
Montana's statutes concerning the alienation of a
beneficiary's interest are inconsistent with other sections in the
Code concerning enforcement of support orders," the elective
share,147 tax collection,"' and the execution of judgments.'4 9
All of these statutes evidence policy goals that contradict the
spendthrift trust goal of insulating the beneficiary's interest; the
intent of these laws is to access all property interests. As well,
the spendthrift trust statute's bar against execution at law frustrates the strong policy of enforcing orders for spousal and child
support. Moreover, spendthrift trust protection mocks the exemption statute. The policy of the exemption statute is intended to
list exclusively the property interests that are safe from execution. 5 0
The question arises whether any exceptions to the validity of
spendthrift trusts are de facto present in Montana. As with every
other state, Montana law invalidates self-settled spendthrift
trusts."' Claims arising in the defense or protection of the
trust itself would also probably be successful under Montana
52
law.1
Montana law is largely silent concerning the other exceptions. As to claims arising from the beneficiary's tax obligations,
the beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust would be reached
by a federal tax lien." 3 The issue remains undecided whether a
Montana tax lien would be equally successful. Under Montana
law, a tax lien would attach to any property of the beneficiary in
a court judgment." However, the spendthrift trust statutes
bar reaching the beneficiary's interest by court judgment until
that interest is paid to the beneficiary.'5 5 Thus, it appears that
146.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-5-242 to -248 (1995).
147.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-221 (1995).
148.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-1-701 to -709 (1995).
149.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-501 (1995).
150.
One might argue that spendthrift trusts are equivalent to exemption statutes, in that both operate to shield an interest in property. However, the policy underlying exemption statutes is very different from that underlying spendthrift trusts.
Bushman, supra note 31, at 311-12. Under exemption statutes, a creditor can conceivably take everything from the debtor but the exempted amount. The creditor gets
some relief, unlike the spendthrift trust that prevents any access by the creditor to
any amount. Id. Exemption statutes also exempt the basic necessary means of living;
spendthrift trusts can reserve even a lavish surplus to the beneficiary. Id.
151.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-33-305 (1995).
152. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
154.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-1-701(2) (1995).
155.
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-33-301 to -304 (1995). One possibility is that the
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the spendthrift provision would bar the State of Montana from
satisfying a tax lien on the beneficiary's interest prior to distribution.
Montana law is ambiguous with regard to claims arising
from services provided to the beneficiary. Under Montana statutory law, the state may charge residents of state care or correctional institutions a per diem.'56 In setting out what is included
in calculating the ability to pay the per diem, the Administrative
Rules of Montana include income from trusts.'5 7 Yet, in another
section of the Rules, the state includes any "long-term resident's
liquid assets which exceed eligibility standards for medicaid...
unless... protected by law or an order of the court."5 ' The
beneficiary's interest is "protected by law"-by the spendthrift
provision as validated by the spendthrift trust statute. Without
Montana's spendthrift trust statutes, the beneficiary's interest in
the trust would be included in the determination of the
beneficiary's ability to pay the per diem for his stay at a state
institution. So, in this instance, claims arising from the provision
of necessaries to the beneficiary may not reach the beneficiary's
interest. Because the state is unable to calculate the per diem
based on a beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust, the taxpayers bear the cost burden.
Yet, in a recent case, In re Estate of Lindgren,'5 9 the Montana Supreme Court created an exception for a claim arising
from the provision of necessaries to the beneficiary. In this case,
the settlor created a discretionary trust to provide for the support of his wife.6 ° Although not addressed by the court, the
support trust effectively qualified for spendthrift trust protection
under Montana's statute which disallows reaching the interest of
a beneficiary in any support trust in a judgment at law until
The exception to spendthrift
disbursed to the beneficiary.'
trusts for necessaries provided to the beneficiary is found where
it would be an abuse of discretion for the trustee not to provide
for the necessaries.'6 2 Similarly, in Lindgren, when the guard-

State would seek to levy against the beneficiary in a court action timed to coincide
with the trustee's distribution to the beneficiary. Telephone Interview with Bruce
McGinnis, Tax Counsel, Montana Department of Revenue (Sept. 22, 1995).
156. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-1-401 to -402, -501 (1995).
157. MONT. ADMIN. R. 20.11.108(2) (1984).
158. MONT. ADMIN. R. 20.11.112(4)(a)(1) (1984) (emphasis added).
159. 268 Mont. 96, 885 P.2d 1280 (1994).
160. Lindgren, 268 Mont. at 97-98, 885 P.2d at 1281.
161.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-33-303 (1995).
162. See generally supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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ian of the beneficiary brought suit to require the trustee to make
payments for the beneficiary's care, the court ordered the trustee
to pay." Thus, in this case, Montana law allowed a claim
against the beneficiary's interest in a de jure spendthrift trust
for necessaries provided to the beneficiary.
Similarly, the law regarding the exception for claims for the
support of dependents of a beneficiary is ambiguous in Montana.
Under Montana law, all property is subject to attachment to
satisfy a support order.'" Moreover, under enforcement of a
support order, a support "lien applies to all real and personal
property.., that the obligor can afterward acquire.""' A beneficiary could also be subject to a civil contempt order.'" To
purge the contempt, the beneficiary may "sell or transfer real or
personal property or transfer real or personal property to the
payee, even if the property is exempt from execution."'6 7
Yet, the spendthrift statute bars any court-ordered lien from
attaching to the interest of a beneficiary in a spendthrift trust,
and also bars the beneficiary from selling or transferring his
interest in a spendthrift trust to purge a contempt order.'" The
support order enforcement statute and the spendthrift trust
statutes contradict each other. Whether a claim for dependent
support can reach the interest of a beneficiary of a spendthrift
trust is ambiguous. Alimony claims are probably even less able
to invade the beneficiary's interest because the support order
enforcement statutes do not enforce alimony claims.'69
Finally, tort creditors under current Montana law cannot
satisfy their claims out of the beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust. Under the statutes, the interest of the beneficiary of
a spendthrift trust is not subject to any judgment order.'7 ° Sim-

163. Lindgren, 268 Mont. at 100, 885 P.2d at 1282-83. The court, implying that
the trustee had abused her discretion, stated:
While the Trust states that the Trustee has sound discretion it also directs
the Trustee to exercise that discretion "liberally" in favor of [the beneficiary]. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the Trustee adopted this
liberal attitude toward the care of the Beneficiary. . . . The denial [by the
trustee] was not in compliance with the purposes of the Trust.
Id.
164. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-5-248 (1995). See generally Thomas W. Christie,
Child Support Enforcement in Montana, 50 MONT. L. REV. 165 (1989).
165. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-5-248(5) (1995).
166. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-5-601 (1995).
167. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-5-601(10)(d) (1995).
168. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-33-301 to -302 (1995).
169. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-5-248 (1995).
170. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-33-301 to -302 (1995). See generally supra notes
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ilarly, general contract creditors have no17 1way to attach the
beneficiary's interest to satisfy their claims.
The one universally-held exception disallowing self-settled
spendthrift trusts should be examined more closely. The law in
all states, including Montana, has barred a settlor from escaping
accountability for his own debts. This same idea applies equally
to the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust. If society believes that a
person should not be allowed to avoid his debts, it makes little
sense to allow him to create a structure in which beneficiaries
may avoid their debts. One may look favorably on the noble
intent of the settlor to provide for another with his life's bounty,
but a creditor is a creditor, and a debt is a debt.7 7 Finally,
173
statutes exempting a basic level of property from execution
and the bankruptcy code protect all debtors, including beneficiaries. Thus, the settlor's spendthrift trust is not the only source of
protection for the beneficiary.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE LEGISLATURE AND COURT
As Griswold put it, "[t]he difficulty comes not so much from
the existence of spendthrift trusts as from their unrestrained
extent." 74 Spendthrift trusts allow potential conflicts between
the settlor's intent and the policy of satisfying worthy claims
against the beneficiary's interest. The discretionary and support
trust alternatives accomplish most of the goals of spendthrift
trusts without creating the same policy dilemma. However, the
spendthrift trust type need not be abolished. It is possible to
imagine a situation in which a settlor wishes to provide for a
completely incapacitated beneficiary, yet the settlor refuses to
rely on the discretion of the trustee in a discretionary trust. The
law should afford a settlor the power to protect a beneficiary
without relinquishing control over distribution decisions to a
trustee in a discretionary trust.
Nevertheless, the settlor's intent should not be absolute, as
it is under Montana's current spendthrift trust doctrine.
Montana's spendthrift trust laws conflict with codified policy
goals. Montana's legislature should consider removing sections
72-33-301 and 72-33-302 of the Montana Code and replacing

116-17 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
172. But cf. Hirsch, supra note 28.
173. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 25-13-601 to -615 (1995).
174. GRISWOLD, supra note 1, § 556, at 639-40.
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them with the following:
RESTRAINT ON TRANSFER OF INCOME OR PRINCIPAL.

(1) Except as provided in 72-33-305, if the trust instrument
provides that a beneficiary's interest is not subject to voluntary
or involuntary transfer, the beneficiary's interest in income or
principal under the trust may not be transferred and is not
subject to enforcement of a money judgment until paid to the
beneficiary.
(2) Such a provision, however, will not be valid as 5to onehalf of the beneficiary's interest in income or principal.'
(3) Claims against the transferable half of the beneficiary's
interest shall be satisfied in the following order of priority:
(a) claims for the education or necessary support of
the beneficiary's children, and claims for the necessary
support of the beneficiary's spouse;
(b) claims for necessary services rendered or necessary supplies furnished to the beneficiary;
(c) claims for tax obligations;
(d) claims for fines arising from a violation of a statute, regulation, or ordinance;" 6
(e) claims arising from a tortious act or omission by
the beneficiary; and
(f) other claims.
In the case of multiple claims within each prioritized category,
claims shall be satisfied in the order that notification of the
claim was received by the trustee.' 7
(4) Under this section, the claimant assumes the right to
receive satisfaction of the claim in the same time and manner
as the beneficiary would receive distribution under the terms of
the trust, notwithstanding the restraint on voluntary or involuntary transfer.
(5) If the trustee refuses to honor a claim and a claimant
brings suit to enforce the claimant's right to recover from the
trust pursuant to this section and the court enters a judgment
in favor of the claimant, the claimant shall be entitled to recover costs and attorney's fees from the trust. Recovery under this

175. This provision tracks the model statute for spendthrift trusts proposed by
Professor Emanuel. Emanuel, supra note 46, at 208. Emanuel's model provision allows only one-third of the beneficiary's interest to be subject to the claims of creditors.
176. Note that, currently, MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-601 (1995) restricts liens for
fines to only real property.
177.
Clause three of this proposal borrows from Griswold's "Model Statute."
GRISWOLD, supra note 1, § 565, at 647-48.
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subsection shall be in addition to recovery under subsection

(3). 178

The proposed statute would certainly limit the protection of
spendthrift trusts in Montana. However, by specifically allowing
claims against only one-half the beneficiary's interest, it ensures
that the other half is protected absolutely. One benefit of the
statute is that, knowing that half his interest is subject to
claims, the beneficiary may feel a positive pressure to prevent
claims from arising against his interest. In this way, the beneficiary is encouraged toward financial responsibility, yet has an
inviolable interest on which to rely. On the other hand, by capping access to the beneficiary's interest at one-half, valid claims
may remain unsatisfied. Still, the statute does strike a compromise between the settlor's intent and the beneficiary's rights and
responsibilities, a middle ground that does not exist under current law.
The proposed statute also poses the risk of litigation if parties differ over the interpretation of the word "necessary" in
subsection three. Although some of this litigation might be avoided by incorporating a definition, each trust will have its own
set the parameters
facts and the court, in its discretion, should
179
case.
each
in
appropriate
as
of "necessary"
The statute proposes to make spendthrift trust protection
available to only half the beneficiary's interest in order to balance equally the intent of the settlor with the rights of creditors. 8 ' Access to half of a debtor's interest arises in other contexts: the surviving spouse may qualify to receive half of a decedent spouse's probate estate; ' a claimant may reach half of
armed forces retirement payments to satisfy child support and
alimony obligations," 2 and claimants may reach half of any
individual's disposable earnings to satisfy a support obligation of
a spouse or dependent child. '83
As an alternative to these statutory revisions, the Montana
Supreme Court should use an active, critical analysis of the

178. This clause is adopted nearly verbatim from Emanuel's model statute for
spendthrift trusts. Emanuel, supra note 46, at 208.
179. See, e.g., In re Estate of Lindgren, 268 Mont. 96, 100, 885 P.2d 1280, 1282
(1994).
180. See Emanuel, supra note 46, at 209.
181. MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-221 (1995).
10 U.S.C. § 1408(e) (1994).
182.
15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(2)(A) (1994). But see 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (1994) (re183.
stricting garnishment generally to only 25 percent of disposable earnings).
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policies underlying spendthrift trusts. With the absence of reasons given by the legislature for the adoption of sections 72-33301 and 72-33-302 of the Montana Code, the court should feel
free to interpret the statutes to allow creditors to reach a
beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust in cases presenting
compelling policy issues. In so doing, the court may rely upon the
majority of law in other states (including California, from which
the current statute was derived without the exceptions). The
Montana Supreme Court has recognized the power of public
policy."M Spendthrift trusts pose important policy questions for
the court to consider.
V.

CONCLUSION

Spendthrift trusts serve effectively the settlor's intent to
provide the beneficiary with a trust interest that is not subject to
alienation. Montana's spendthrift trust law fully serves the
settlor's intent. However, serving the settlor's intent is nonetheless a policy decision. Other policies, such as enforcing child
support and reimbursing the provider for necessary services to
the beneficiary, are equally compelling. One solution, proposed
here, is to split the difference. Half of the beneficiary's interest
will serve the settlor's intent, thus preventing voluntary and
involuntary alienation of the trust interest. The other half of the
beneficiary's interest will serve the beneficiary, thus allowing
him to squander or responsibly fulfill his obligations as he (or a
court) sees fit. Absent this solution, the policy dilemma will continue, with the threat of litigation just around the corner and
trust practitioners left to wonder about the inviolability of the
spendthrift trust provisions they draft for clients.

184. See Youngblood v. American States Ins. Co., 262 Mont. 391, 395, 866 P.2d
203, 205 (1993) (holding that public policy overrides contractual choice of law).
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